We must first focus on “Western liberal” qualities that the Chinese misguidedly see as weaknesses. Our gaze should then shift to explicit, protective steps we must take. They include the following:

• Many universities, research labs, and companies in countries that value the rule of law and individual rights are witting or unwitting accomplices in China’s use of technology to repress its people and improve the Chinese military’s capabilities. For dual-use technologies, the private sector should seek new partnerships with those who share commitments to free-market economies, representative government, and the rule of law, not with those acting against these principles. Many companies are engaged in joint ventures or partnerships that help China develop technologies suited for internal security, such as surveillance, artificial intelligence, and biogenetics. In one of many examples, a Massachusetts-based company sold DNA-sampling equipment that has helped the Chinese government track Uighurs in Xinjiang. (The company has ended such sales.) Companies that knowingly collaborate with China’s efforts to repress their people or build threatening military capabilities should be penalized.
• American stock exchanges list many Chinese companies directly or indirectly involved in domestic human-rights abuses and violation of international treaties. Those companies benefit from the U.S. and other Western investors. Stricter screening of U.S., European, and Japanese capital markets would help restrict corporate and investor complicity in China’s authoritarian agenda. Free-market economies like ours control most of the world’s capital, and we have far more leverage than we are employing.
• We must counter China’s use of major telecommunications companies to control communications networks and the internet overseas. There should no longer be any dispute concerning the need to defend against the multinational technology company Huawei and its role in China’s security apparatus. In 2019, a series of investigations revealed incontrovertible evidence of the grave national-security danger associated with a wide array of Huawei’s telecommunications equipment. China’s Ministry of State Security and the intelligence arm of the People’s Liberation Army simultaneously employ many Huawei workers. Huawei technicians have used intercepted cell data to help autocratic leaders in Africa spy on, locate, and silence political opponents. A priority area for multinational cooperation among free societies should be developing infrastructure, particularly 5G communications, to form trusted networks that protect sensitive and proprietary data.
• We must defend against Chinese agencies that coordinate influence operations abroad—such as the Ministry of State Security, the United Front Work Department, and the Chinese Students and Scholars Association. At the same time, we should try to maximize positive interactions and experiences with the Chinese people. The United States and other free and open societies should consider issuing more visas and providing paths to citizenship for more Chinese—with proper safeguards in place. Chinese who engage with citizens of free countries are the ones who are most likely to question their government’s policies—whether from abroad or when they return home.
• The U.S. and other free nations should view expatriate communities as a strength. The Chinese living abroad can provide a significant counter to Beijing’s propaganda and disinformation if we protect them from the meddling and espionage of their government. Investigations and expulsions of the Ministry of State Security and other agents should orient toward protecting both the targeted country and protecting the Chinese expatriates within it.